7 research outputs found
Electricity Restructuring in China: The Elusive Quest for Competition
The continuation of China’s remarkable economic growth will depend on continued increases in electricity supply. China has commenced a program of electricity sector restructuring, with the announced aim of relying on markets and competition to provide incentives for attracting private investment and encouraging efficiency. However, a close examination of the generation markets being created suggests that truly free wholesale prices are likely to be both high and volatile. This may be the reason that these prices have not yet been freed – and it may not bode well for true market liberalization in the future.Electricity Restructuring, Competition, China
A Case for Affirmative Action in Competition Policy
We analyze the trade-off faced by competition authorities envisaging a one-shot structural reform in a capitalistic industry. A structure is (1) a sharing of productive capital at some time and (2) a sharing of sites or any other non-reproducible assets. The latter represent opportunities. These two distinct dimensions of policy illustrate the importance of a dynamic theory in which firms may differ in several respects. Though equalization of endowments and rights is theoretically optimal, realistic constraints force competition authorities to adopt second-best solutions. Affirmative action here appears to explain why helping the disadvantaged contributes maximally to social surplus.Competition policy, capacity accumulation, Cournot competition, asymmetric duopoly, regulatory consistency, differential games
Assessing Unfair Pricing under China\u27s Anti-Monopoly Law for Innovation-Intensive Industries
China, like a number of other antitrust jurisdictions, has a law concerning unfair pricing. This article develops an economic framework for applying the unfair pricing law in China. The framework draws on the experience of courts and competition authorities in other jurisdictions and the writings of various commentators, particularly economists, on unfair pricing in those jurisdictions. It shows that virtually all jurisdictions have decided to consider unfair pricing claims only in exceptional circumstances, and rarely, if ever, in innovation-intensive industries. For those cases that pass this screen and receive consideration, the courts and competition authorities then, under the leading test, insist on substantial evidence that the price is significantly higher than cost and is unfair given the value provided to the buyer. This article shows that the exceptional circumstances screen and the rigorous unfair pricing test are motivated by a recognition, supported by substantial empirical evidence, that successful firms must have the assurance of receiving significant rewards to induce them to invest time and capital in highly risky innovation that is the source of economic growth and welfare. It concludes by showing that this approach is consistent with modern Chinese economic policy
A Case for Affirmative Action in Competition Policy
We analyze the trade-off faced by competition authorities envisaging a one-shot structural reform in a capitalistic industry. A structure is (1) a sharing of productive capital at some time and (2) a sharing of sites or any other non-reproducible assets. The latter represent opportunities. These two distinct dimensions of policy illustrate the importance of a dynamic theory in which firms may differ in several respects. Though equalization of endowments and rights is theoretically optimal, realistic constraints force competition authorities to adopt second-best solutions. Affirmative action here appears to explain why helping the disadvantaged contributes maximally to social surplus
ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN CHINA: HOW COMPETITIVE WILL GENERATION MARKETS BE?
The continuation of China's remarkable economic growth will depend on continued increases in electricity supply. China has commenced a program of electricity sector restructuring, with the announced aim of relying on markets and competition to provide incentives for attracting private investment and encouraging efficiency. However, a close examination of the generation markets being created suggests that truly free wholesale prices are likely to be both high and volatile. This may be the reason that these prices have not yet been freed — and it may not bode well for true market liberalization in the future.Electricity restructuring, competition, China, L94, O13, P28, Q48
Assessing Unfair Pricing under China\u27s Anti-Monopoly Law for Innovation-Intensive Industries
China, like a number of other antitrust jurisdictions, has a law concerning unfair pricing. This article develops an economic framework for applying the unfair pricing law in China. The framework draws on the experience of courts and competition authorities in other jurisdictions and the writings of various commentators, particularly economists, on unfair pricing in those jurisdictions. It shows that virtually all jurisdictions have decided to consider unfair pricing claims only in exceptional circumstances, and rarely, if ever, in innovation-intensive industries. For those cases that pass this screen and receive consideration, the courts and competition authorities then, under the leading test, insist on substantial evidence that the price is significantly higher than cost and is unfair given the value provided to the buyer. This article shows that the exceptional circumstances screen and the rigorous unfair pricing test are motivated by a recognition, supported by substantial empirical evidence, that successful firms must have the assurance of receiving significant rewards to induce them to invest time and capital in highly risky innovation that is the source of economic growth and welfare. It concludes by showing that this approach is consistent with modern Chinese economic policy